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IN PRAISE OF FRANK RAMSEY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE
THEORY OF TAXATION*
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Frank Ramsey’s brilliant 1927 paper, modestly entitled, ‘A contribution to the theory of
taxation’, is a landmark in the economics of public finance. Nearly a half century later,
through the work of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Mirrlees (1971), his paper can
be thought of as launching the field of optimal taxation and revolutionising public
finance.1
Ramsey, in his short life, made pathbreaking contributions to two other fields, the
theory of optimal growth (Ramsey, 1928) and the theory of subjective probability
(Ramsey, 1926).2 Here, he addresses a question which he says was posed to him by A. C.
Pigou: given that commodity taxes are distortionary, what is the best way of raising
revenues, i.e. what is the set of taxes to raise a given revenue whichmaximises utility. The
answer is now commonly referred to as Ramsey taxes. The basic insight was that taxes
should be set so as to reduce the consumption of each good (along its compensated
demand curve) equi-proportionately. He establishes this result in two contexts:
(i) if the government needs to raise only a small amount of tax revenue; and
(ii) if utility functions are quadratic.
The analysis is beautiful, mathematically sophisticated, making use of all the artillery
in the theory of consumer behaviour, including the symmetry of the Slutsky relations.
The conclusion overturned simplistic analyses that somehow continue to prevail in
some quarters for decades after Ramsey’s paper and, in some subfields of economics,
continue to this day. Some economists argued against differential taxation on the
grounds that it is best just to have a single tax (typically on wages). A wage tax
introduces a single distortion – between the marginal rate of substitution between
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labour and consumption and the marginal rate of transformation. Interest income
taxes and commodity taxes introduce additional distortions. (Interestingly, Ramsey’s
analysis has, wrongly, continued to be used by some economists to argue against the
taxation of capital.)3
As another example of such simplistic economics, some macroeconomists continue
to argue that monetary authorities should only interfere with the market in setting
short-term interest rates.
Ramsey showed that efficient taxation required imposing a complete array of taxes –
not just a single tax. A large number of small distortions, carefully constructed, is better
than a single large distortion. And he showed precisely what these market interventions
would look like. (He even explains that the optimal intervention might require
subsidies – what he calls bounties – for some commodities. ‘A tax on sugar might
reduce the consumption of damsons more than in proportion to the reduction in the
total consumption of sugar and so require to be offset by a bounty on damsons’,
Ramsey, 1927, p. 54). Similar reasoning would suggest that if there are a variety of tools
for managing the macroeconomy, in general, they should all be employed.
In this short celebratory article, I briefly describe Ramsey’s basic insights (Section 1),
andtheearlyhistoryof thedevelopmentof the ideasbasedonRamsey’spaper(Section 2).
While severalof thesecrucialdevelopments showedthatRamsey’s conclusionsheldunder
more general conditions than he had assumed, later analyses showed crucial qualifica-
tions, so that the policy relevance of Ramsey’s analysis may be limited.
1. Major Insights
One of the striking aspects of the paper is that he not only provides a general
formulation of the set of optimal taxes but he also translates this into concrete results
in the case of linear demand and supply functions (quadratic utility functions) and
shows how the results can be extended to situations when there are restrictions on the
set of feasible taxes. In particular, when there are a set of commodities with fixed taxes
(including commodities that cannot be taxed at all), he shows that there should be an
equi-proportionate reduction in the goods for which taxes can be freely set. In the case
of linear and separable demand and supply curves (quadratic utility functions) and
small taxes, he shows that optimal taxes are inversely related to the compensated
elasticity of demand and supply.
t=p ¼ 1=elasticity of demandþ 1=elasticity of supply. (1)
This implies, of course, raising all the requisite revenue from a good which is either
inelastically demanded or supplied, because such a tax generates no distortions. This
in turn has one other implication: if say labour is supplied inelastically, then optimal
taxation requires imposing a tax on labour alone; but a proportionate tax on all
commodities is equivalent to a tax on labour. This is hardly a surprising result – one for
which one did not need Ramsey’s apparatus (as Ramsey himself recognised): when
3 See the discussion below and the references cited there.
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there is an inelastic factor, it has long been recognised that there is no distortion
associated with taxing it.4
Ramsey’s analysis can be viewed as the first successful exercise in second best
economics. First best economics called for the imposition of lump sum taxes. Later,
Meade (1955) and Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) would call attention to the fact that when
some of the efficiency conditions are not satisfied, it may mean that others should not be
satisfied. Their analysis would suggest that it would be very difficult indeed to characterise
optimal resource allocations under such conditions. But Ramsey showed precisely how
this could be done, when the reason for the distortion (the discrepancy between the
marginal rate of substitution in preferences and the marginal rate of transformation in
production) was to raise funds for the government.
Ramsey, however, went beyond this into an exploration of third best economics. He
asked, what happens if there are some commodities that cannot be taxed, or whose tax
rates are fixed. He argues that the same result (on the equi-proportionate reduction in
consumption) holds for the set of goods that can be freely taxed.
Much of the huge subsequent literature on optimal taxation has been concerned with
applying Ramsey’s insights, for example, to the theory of capital taxation; extending the
results, for example, to more explicitly general equilibrium models); and to under-
standing the limits of the results. This article briefly notes some key examples in each of
these areas.
2. Earlier Dissemination
While Ramsey’s work was incorporated into Pigou’s (1928) classical public finance
textbook, for several decades, his work had limited impacts on the broader, and more
institutional, field of public finance. Interestingly, one of the early developments in the
design of optimal taxes (by Corlett and Hague, 1953) was a special application of
Ramsey’s analysis, without fully realising it. They argued that if leisure cannot be taxed,
then one should impose surrogate taxes, taxing complements to leisure at a higher rate
(and conversely, substitutes should be taxed at a lower rate). The extreme case is easy
to see: if the consumption of some good was perfectly associated with leisure, then a tax
on that good is fully equivalent to a tax on leisure.
Ramsey’s results were seemingly independently discovered by Boiteux (1956),5 in
the context of regulatory policy – analysing the optimal prices for a regulated utility
which has to raise revenues to pay the fixed costs of the utility. The basic insight was
fully parallel: prices (relative to marginal costs) should be raised so that there was an
equi-proportionate reduction in consumption along the compensated demand curve.
It was a short distance from there to the observation that a multi-product monopolist
would charge Ramsey-like prices. The fact that a monopolist and a welfare maximising
government would impose similar prices suggested that perhaps monopoly was not as
4 Henry (1886) focused on the taxation of land as the inelastic supply factor of production. Subsequent
research by Vickrey (1977, 1999) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) identified conditions under which such a tax
would provide all the revenue that was required for financing public goods (in economies in which there was
a local public good and congestion or other factors leading to decreasing returns to scale led to optimal sized
communities.)
5 English translation 1971. See also Baumol and Bradford (1970).
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bad as had previously been thought; and that conclusion became reinforced in those
contexts where monopoly profits are driven to zero by contestability6 (i.e. as firms
compete for the market) – or in contexts where the government auctions off the right
to be the monopolist; for then it would appear that the monopoly pricing is identical to
that which would arise in the case of a ‘social planner’ maximising the utility of the
representative agent, subject to the constraint that monopoly profits are zero, i.e. no
lump subsidy to the firm is allowed to offset its fixed cost. I say ‘appear’, because the
conclusion is not in general true, as Sappington and Stiglitz (1987a,b) explain. For
instance, the government would take into account the effect of any change in the
prices it charges on the revenues that the government raises from taxes or other sources;
the monopolist would not. The government would be sensitive to the distributional
consequences of alternative pricing structures; the monopolist would not.
3. Diamond–Mirrlees
Ramsey’s influence on modern public finance has been largely mediated through the
foundational paper of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) (DM), which set Ramsey’s
problem in the context of a fully specified general equilibrium problem. Assuming a
standard constant returns to scale neoclassical production function and that linear
taxes could be levied on every commodity (but that lump sum taxes could not be
imposed), they showed that Ramsey’s results held at the margin even when the
revenues raised by government were large. (There were many other insights to their
analysis – most importantly, that one only wanted to impose taxes on consumption;
one did not want to impose any taxes that would interfere with production efficiency.)7
Though the most general Diamond–Mirrlees’s result on equi-proportionate reduc-
tions in output of each commodity along the compensated demand curves8 seemed
fully parallel to that of Ramsey, the exploration of specialised applications suggested
what might at first seem a puzzling difference: with separable demand functions, while
Diamond–Mirrlees suggested that tax rates ought to be inversely proportional to the
elasticity of demand (of the compensated demand curve), Ramsey had suggested that
it was related both to the elasticity of demand and supply. Ramsey’s result seems
intuitive: there is no distortion associated with taxing a good with a zero supply
elasticity. The two results are reconciled, once one takes into account the particular
technology employed by Diamond–Mirrlees. In DM, there are no rents. In effect,
supply curves are infinitely elastic.
4. Profits and Restricted Taxation
That raised a question: what is the optimal structure of commodity taxes if there are
profits. Ramsey had posed another question: what do third best tax structures look like,
6 See, e.g. Baumol et al. (1982). For a survey, see Brock (1983). As Farrell (1986) and Stiglitz (1988) point
out, markets will not be contestable if there are even arbitrarily small sunk costs.
7 As we note below, this result was not general.
8 As Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971) point out, what is required is an equi-proportionate reduction in
consumption relative to what it would have been if consumer prices were at the after-tax producer prices. The
after-tax producer prices may differ markedly from the before-tax producer prices.
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when one cannot impose lump sum taxes but one is also restricted with respect to the
set of (linear) taxes that one can impose on other commodities? Ramsey had shown
that his equi-proportionate result still holds for taxes on those commodities which
could be freely taxed. Was this true in a general equilibrium model? More generally,
the question was posed: what do various restrictions on the set of taxes that can be
imposed imply for the structure of commodity taxes and: what are plausible restrictions
on the set of taxes? Identifying the feasible set of taxes was key to the analysis of the
optimal tax structure. For if lump sum taxes were feasible (which would naturally be
the case if all individuals were identical, as Ramsey had hypothesised), then there
would be no need to resort to distortionary commodity taxes.
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (DS), who had been working in Cambridge as Diamond and
Mirrlees were engaged in their pioneering work, were able to provide answers to these
questions and, in doing so, qualified both the work of Ramsey and DM. When there is
diminishing returns to scale (or there is a fixed factor) there will be rents (pure profits)
and, as we noted earlier, when there are rents, they should be taxed first, before one
turns to distortionary taxes. DS suggest three other general principles, parallel to the
insight of Corlett and Hague (1953):
(i) use factor or commodity taxes to offset the effects of factors or taxes that
cannot be taxed, even if doing so results in production inefficiency or
abrogates the ‘equi-proportionate reduction in consumption’ rule;
(ii) especially increase taxes on products that provide an indirect tax on rents/
profits; and
(iii) but to the extent that there are taxes on profits/rents, take into account the
effect of the commodity tax on the revenues raised from the profits/rent tax.9
DM’s analysis had been extremely influential in arguing against some important
categories of taxes that interfere with productive efficiency. Tariffs on produced goods
distorted production towards home-produced goods. The corporation tax seemingly
distorted production away from goods produced in corporations. By contrast, DS
showed that third (or fourth) best taxation may require taxation that interferes with
production efficiency.10
Some examples illustrate: consider petrol. Petrol used by consumers can be
considered an input into the production of transport services – that is the final
consumption good being produced. Production efficiency requires not taxing an
input, but taxing the output (transport services) but that output cannot be taxed (i.e.
one cannot observe directly the amount the car is driven).11 Hence, it is ‘optimal’ to
tax the input of petrol as a surrogate for the (missing) tax on the output, even though
9 This result was very much in the spirit of Ramsey and DM, who emphasised the effect of an increase in
the tax on one commodity on the revenues raised by other taxes.
10 At the same time, they showed that when the rents of different producers can be taxed at different rates,
production efficiency is still desirable.
11 Even if one could observe the total amount driven, that would not be a good measure of the ‘output’. A
taxi cab charges different amounts for driving at different times of the day and the fees reflect too the degree
of congestion, so too, in principle, should we want to differentiate the amount driven in different
circumstances. These are different ‘outputs’, and if we do not tax different outputs at different rates, we are
imposing a constraint on the set of feasible taxes. DM assumed no such constraints; the discussion below
describes the implications.
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doing so introduces a production inefficiency. If we cannot tax the pure profits (rents)
arising in the oil industry, it may be optimal to impose a (higher) tax (than we
otherwise would) on the output of the oil industry (petrol). On the other hand, if we
do tax the pure profits (rents) in the oil industry, we need to adjust the optimal tax on
petrol to take into account the lower revenues that will result as a consequence of the
tax.
These results are of particular relevance in developing countries, where it may not be
possible to tax the output in agriculture, especially goods that are sold within the rural
sector. But it may be possible to tax some of the inputs. It may be possible to tax, for
instance, fertiliser, or imports of tractors. Doing so would clearly cause a production
distortion. But as a third best policy, it may still be desirable to do so (Emran and
Stiglitz, 2005; Stiglitz, 2010. For an example of the controversy to which this gave rise,
see Keen, 2008).
In some special cases, one can obtain results of a remarkably simple form analogous
to those obtained by Ramsey. DS showed that with a pure profits tax at the rate s, in the
special case of his independent demand curves, we obtain instead of (1):12
t=p ¼ 1=elasticity of demandþ ð1 sÞ=elasticity of supply: (2)
With a 100% tax on pure profits or infinite supply elasticities, we get a result
analogous to DM, where it is only properties of the demand function which affect tax
rate. With a zero tax on pure profits, we get the original Ramsey result. Ramsey had
implicitly assumed that all profits were distributed to the owners of the firm, and not
collected by the government. For finite supply elasticities, the higher the rent tax, the
lower the commodity tax rate, because of the adverse effect of the increase in the
commodity tax on the government revenues from the rent tax.
One might well ask, why not impose a 100% tax on profits? The answer brings us to
what I have emphasised is the key issue in determining the set of feasible taxes – itself
central to the question of the design of the tax system: imperfect information and what
is observable. Earlier, we noted that in developing countries, taxation in the rural
sector is limited: it is not possible for government to observe most transactions, for
example, among farmers (Sah and Stiglitz, 1992). By the same token, we know that
some of the returns to a firm in excess of payments to labour and other inputs is a
result of entrepreneurial effort; it is not just pure profits, or even monopoly profits.
While the government cannot identify what part is due to entrepreneurial effort, it
knows that a 100% ‘profits’ tax would squelch effort. The optimal profit tax rate takes
into account the impact of that tax on effort (Mirrlees, 1972).
DS’s analysis of the analysis of commodity taxation with imperfect profits tax seemed
much out of the spirit of Ramsey’s important analysis of the design of commodity
taxation when there were some commodities that were not taxed (or whose tax rates
were fixed). He suggested that this additional restriction did not affect the optimal
taxation of those that could be taxed. DS showed that his conclusion was not general: it
only held if the demand for the taxed goods does not depend on the prices of the
untaxed or partially taxed goods and vice versa. The intuition follows from what we have
said above: one of the goods for which taxes are free to adjust may be a good surrogate
12 These are compensated elasticities.
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for the untaxed good, and it may be desirable to use this surrogate. Alternatively, an
increase in taxes on the freely taxed goods may lead to a reduction in revenues on the
goods with fixed taxes, and clearly the government would take that into account.
There is another set of restrictions that Ramsey did not consider but is important in
practice: there may be a group of commodities that may have to be taxed at the same
rate, even though their demand (and where relevant, supply) properties may differ,
and, accordingly in the Ramsey analysis, if it were possible to tax them at different
rates, these goods should be taxed differently.13 DS provide a simple formula for how
that tax should be set: one forms a composite commodity (weighing the different
goods by the consumer prices in equilibrium) and the reduction in consumption of
this composite commodity should be the same as it is for other commodities.
But once again, the general principle of restricted taxation applies: if it is possible to
indirectly tax some product within the composite which in an unrestrained world
would have faced a higher tax, it is desirable to do so, for example, by taxing factor
inputs into that sector – even if doing so leads to production inefficiency.
5. Distributional Considerations
There was something distinctly unpleasant about Ramsey’s recommendations: it
suggested taxing the necessities of life, which tend to have low price elasticities
(especially for the poor) at a high rate. If such a policy were pursued, it would imply
that taxation should be regressive.
Of course, Ramsey considered a model in which all individuals were identical, so
distributional issues simply did not arise. But if all individuals were identical, there
would be no problem imposing a lump sum tax. The only reason that we resort to
distortionary commodity taxes is implicitly because we are concerned with the
regressivity of a lump sum (per capita) tax. But that in turn means that we have to focus
explicitly on the distributional consequences of commodity taxation.
When we do this, not surprisingly we obtain markedly different results. There is a
tension between imposing high taxes on commodities with low (compensated) price
elasticities (generating low dead weight loss) and imposing high taxes on commodities
with high income elasticities – resulting in a more progressive tax system. (The precise
formulas are given, for example, by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972, 1980), and depend on
the weight given to equity.)14
But if we are concerned with equity, in general, there is no reason to limit ourselves
to commodity taxation. Ramsey’s analysis can, as we observed earlier, be viewed as the
first (and one of the best) examples of second best welfare economics. He assumed
that lump sum taxes were not feasible and asked what is the best set of distortionary
commodity taxes. But in the theory of the second best, it is always necessary to be
precise about what are the constraints: even if lump sum taxes are not feasible, other
13 There are a couple of reasons for this restriction. Partly it is administrative: the cost of having millions of
tax rates, one for each precisely identified commodity, would be large. Partly it is based on information:
private parties would have an incentive to try to get their products classified as one of the lower taxed
products. It is costly for the government to gather the information required to implement and enforce fine
differentiations.
14 See also Diamond (1975) and Mirrlees (1975).
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taxes may be. Most importantly, the government can impose redistributive income
taxes, or even possibly redistributive wage taxes.
Going beyond the analysis of taxation with identical individuals, one faces a
problem: how does one weigh the well-being of different individuals? The standard
approach in the theory of optimal taxation developing out of Ramsey’s work was to use
a utilitarian social welfare function, i.e. simply ‘add up’ the utility of different
individuals. But it turns out that many, if not most, of the qualitative results can be
extended to Pareto efficient tax structures, tax structures such that no one (no group)
can be made better off without making someone else – or some group – worse off.
Thus, the set of Pareto efficient tax structures depends explicitly on the set of
feasible taxes.15 If the number of hours worked is observable, then it is possible to have
progressive wage taxes. If only income is observable (the product of wages per hour
and the number of hours worked), then it is possible to have a progressive income tax
but not a progressive wage tax.
But in the presence of a progressive income tax, the optimal set of commodity
taxes looks markedly different from that suggested by Ramsey. In one polar case,
where (the entire vector of) consumption is separable from leisure (work), Pareto
efficient taxation implies no commodity taxation (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976;
Mirrlees, 1976).
Kaplow (2006) shows that under the separability condition, whenever there is
distortionary commodity taxation, a distribution neutral Pareto improvement can be
obtained through the income tax system. Without separability or in the presence of
consumer heterogeneity, however, commodity taxation may be desirable: if richer
individuals consume proportionately more chocolate, or if chocolate is a substitute for
leisure, a chocolate tax may enable one to obtain a desired redistribution with less
distortion in the income tax system.
Though the case of separability is very special, what the Atkinson–Stiglitz theorem
illustrates is that in the presence of an (optimal) income tax, the optimal set of
commodity taxes looks markedly different from that described by Ramsey.
In particular, commodity taxation can be viewed as a particular type of Pigouvian
corrective tax.16 The focus is not on the impact on tax revenues, or even directly on
dead weight losses (as usually conceived), but on impacts on the self-selection
constraints that are central to the design of the optimal income tax. ‘Loosening’ the
self-selection constraints has a first order effect on welfare, while the distortions
associated with small commodity taxation have a second order effect on welfare.17
6. Non-linear Taxation and Heterogeneous Individuals
Moreover, once one admits the possibility of non-linear income taxes, should not one
consider the possibility of non-linear commodity taxes? If so, the problem that Ramsey
solved was a special case of a more general problem (just as the optimal linear income
15 The concept of Pareto efficient taxation is noted in Mirrlees (1976) and Stiglitz (1982a), and explored
further in Stiglitz (1985, 1987, 1998) and Brito et al. (1990). See also Konishi (1995) and Saez (2002).
16 For a more general discussion of Pigouvian corrective taxes, see the commentary below.
17 This is the essential point of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and Arnott et al. (1994).
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tax (Stiglitz, 2009) is a special case of the optimal non-linear income tax (Mirrlees,
1971)). Of course, as we have already noted, the special case may be the more relevant
case. For many commodities, the possibility of arbitrage means that taxes have to be
linear; but there are some commodities, perhaps most importantly, electricity, for
which arbitrage opportunities are typically limited.
Most of the work in the analysis of optimal taxation with heterogeneous individuals
assumes that individuals differ in simple ways, for example, their productivity, but not
their preferences. This enables us to elide the classical welfare question of interper-
sonal utility comparisons. There is a simple question that has to be answered for
determining the optimal degree of progressivity: if (full) income increases by 1%, by
what percentage does the marginal social utility of income decrease? A broad
consensus has emerged within the fraternity of optimal tax economists that the answer
(related to revealed individual behaviour, e.g. in the context of risk taking) is by 1–2%.
But if individuals have different indifference curves (curves that cross, perhaps even
more than once), there is no such easy trick available. Changes in relative prices can
have markedly different effects on different individuals, even with roughly similar
income. In practice, we give considerable weight to the current set of consumer prices
(affected as they may be by government policy) and assess the welfare impact by
looking at the income equivalent changes arising from the proposed change in tax (or
expenditure) policy.18
7. An Information Theoretic Perspective
There are many easily observable ways in which individuals differ that are easily
observable, for example, age, gender, marital status, some of which (like age and
gender) are not (easily) alterable. In principle, if the unobservable or imperfectly
observable characteristics that we would like to base taxation on are correlated with
observable characteristics or behaviour, there is some presumption that we should
differentiate taxes based on those observables – unless all the relevant information is
contained in some other variable that might more easily be the basis of taxation.19
Thus, with separability of utility (between consumption and leisure) and the only
basis of individual differences being labour productivity, an optimal progressive
income tax fully captures the relevant information. But if more productive
individuals (and only more productive individuals) eat chocolate ice cream rather
than vanilla ice cream, then it might be desirable to supplement the optimal income
tax with a tax on chocolate ice cream.20 Similarly, we might feel that individuals have
relatively little choice about how much they spend on heating – the main
determinant is the weather – but it is not possible to observe the weather conditions
18 Implicitly, the standard approach sets utility levels of two individuals with different preferences but the
same income (at current wages and prices) as the same. The point is that we might come to very different
views of the distributional impacts if we set the utility levels to be the same at different wages and prices, and
assess the income equivalent impact of a change in a tax off of that different base.
19 It is an open question why more extensive use of such variables is not made. In practice, some
redistribution for the elderly is done through the social insurance system.
20 For an early formal discussion of this point, see Mirrlees (1976); for a more recent discussion, see Saez
(2002).
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under which each individual lives. But fuel consumption may be (imperfectly)
correlated with the weather, especially for poor individuals. Of course, some
individuals may consume more fuel because they like a warmer temperature, and it is
inefficient to subsidise fuel consumption, because it leads to excessive consumption.
Still, an optimal tax structure might include a fuel subsidy, at least for poor
individuals. While economists have typically criticised these subsidies, the optimal tax
theory growing out of Ramsey’s seminal work provides a rationale.21
8. General Equilibrium Incidence
We have described how at the centre of modern optimal tax theory and the work
growing out of Ramsey lies a balancing of distributional and efficiency concerns. The
early literature essentially took the before tax-and-transfer distribution of income, or
more accurately, the relative wages of different individuals, as given. It worried about
how an increase in taxes on the rich might affect their labour supply and thus the
supply of funds available for redistribution. But government tax and expenditure
policies can change the before tax and transfer distribution and, in particular, relative
wages. This can, reduce the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution policies.
If it is possible to do so, governments should – again, even possibly if it doing so
interferes with production efficiency, or seemingly reduces the progressivity of the tax
system.
Thus, assume there are two kinds of labour, skilled and unskilled, which are
complements. By encouraging greater supply of skilled labour, the relative wages of the
unskilled labour will increase. If skilled labourers have by and large higher incomes,
this suggests that they be confronted with lower marginal tax rates but, if possible, with
higher average tax rates, than they otherwise would have faced.22
9. Interest Income Tax
Ramsey’s analysis also had important and profound implications concerning the
taxation of interest income, which he himself recognised. We can treat current and
future consumption as two different commodities.23 Taxing interest income can (at
least in some simple models) be viewed simply as a tax on future consumption. The
question, then, is do they have the same price elasticities? If not, then they should be
21 Much of the criticism though is based on political economy concerns that go well beyond the simple
normative framework posited by Ramsey. The magnitude of the subsidies, once enacted, often go well
beyond anything that could be justified by an optimal tax framework and are hard to reverse when
circumstances change.
22 See Stiglitz (1985, 1998). An increase in the average tax rate and a decrease in the marginal tax rate will
ensure that income and substitution effects reinforce each other to increase the supply of skilled labour. In
some simple models where, in the absence of general equilibrium effects, the limiting marginal tax rate is
zero, in their presence, it may be negative. There is, of course, a large body of work on general equilibrium
incidence, going back to the work of Harberger (1962) and of Mieszkowski (1969). In the context of
the subject at hand, see Diamond (1978) and Naito (1999).
23 Ramsey treated savings and consumption as two different commodities and argued that capital should
be taxed but at a lower rate than wage income. Later literature paid relatively little attention to Ramsey’s
formulation.
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taxed at different rates. (A priori, it is possible that future consumption be taxed at a
lower rate, i.e. that there be an interest income subsidy.)
In the standard model with infinite lived individuals with constant utility discount
rate, the long-run supply elasticity of capital is infinite, which means that there should
be no taxation of capital.24
The Atkinson–Stiglitz result that with separability and an optimal (wage) income tax,
there should be no commodity taxation had a deeply disturbing corollary: there should
be no taxes on interest income. A host of conservative economists have exploited these
results, without fully understanding their limitations, to inveigh against capital
taxation, including inheritance taxation.25
These results, though, need to be qualified, for several reasons, related to the
general observations made earlier. We might, for instance, like to tax wealthier
individuals at a higher rate, particularly if they are in part wealthier because they
have received large amounts of human or financial capital from their parents.
Levelling the playing field – providing more equality of opportunity – necessitates
a tax on such cross generational distributions. We cannot, however, monitor such
transfers perfectly but capital income may be correlated with such transfers
(especially at the upper end) and, if so, they provide an appropriate basis for
taxation.26
Piketty and Saez (2012) also explain how if there is uninsurable uncertainty about
future returns, capital taxation can be viewed as providing insurance against returns
(similar to a point made by Domar and Musgrave, 1944).27 Aiyagari (1995) and
Chamley (2001) shows that the result does not hold when insurance markets are
incomplete and their borrowing constraints. Ganesa et al. (2009) obtain corresponding
results in an overlapping generations model.
24 Judd (1985, 1999), Stiglitz (1985) and Chamley (1986). As Piketty and Saez (2012) point out, there are
several reasons for this result, including the particular formulation of the welfare criterion. Stiglitz (1985,
1998) shows that the results hold even in an overlapping generations model.
25 See, for instance, Lucas (1990), Atkeson et al. (1999) and Mankiw et al. (2009).
26 A variety of papers have explored these ideas. See in particular Cremer et al. (2003), Farhi and Werning
(2010) and Piketty and Saez (2012). As Piketty and Saez (2012) put it: ‘In sum, two-dimensional inequality
requires two-dimensional tax policy tools’. Piketty and Saez assume that the reason some individuals give
more bequests than others is that they have a ‘taste’ for bequests. Earlier literature on bequests argued,
however, that one of the main reasons for differences in bequests related to uncertainty about the timing of
death and the absence of good annuities, in which case, adverse effects of taxing bequests will be limited
(Stiglitz, 1978). A key question in analysing bequest behaviour is why such a large fraction of the population
leaves a near-zero bequest and a key challenge is to reconcile the predicted wealth distribution with the
observed wealth distribution, i.e. how to reconcile observed patterns of income and wealth distribution. In a
model with i.i.d. distributions, with even a modest amount of caring for one’s descendants one would expect
a larger fraction of the population providing bequests than is in fact observed. Bevan and Stiglitz (1979)
assume that the stochastic process for abilities exhibits serial correlation but regression towards the mean, but
that negative bequests are not feasible; and in such a model, they are able to explain some of the key observed
features. They did not, however, explore optimal tax implications.
27 The implications for tax policy were pursued in several subsequent papers, e.g. Stiglitz (1969, 1972).
After noting this as a potential role for taxation, Stiglitz (1985) raises a question about the reason that such
risks are uninsurable. If it is because of potential adverse incentive effects, then in effect government
provided insurance may be little better than private insurance, i.e. there may be the same adverse effects.
Government provided risk sharing may simply replace privately provided risk sharing. It should be noted that
the extent to which capital taxation performs this risk-sharing role depends on details of the tax code, e.g. the
extent to which there are loss-carry forward and back provisions.
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General equilibrium effects provide a more ambiguous basis of capital taxation. If
capital is a substitute for unskilled labour (as seems increasingly the case with
robotisation) but a complement of skilled labour (an implication of skill-biased
innovation) then a capital tax might not only improve the after-tax distribution of
income but also the before tax distribution of income. There can also be distributional
effects through the demand side, for example, taxation of capital intensive consump-
tion goods and subsidising unskilled labour intensive goods may lead to an
improvement in the before-tax-and-transfer distribution of income.28
One of the most important reasons for taxing capital income is that we cannot clearly
distinguish capital income from wage income, particularly the labour that goes into
managing capital. When an investor gets an above average return, should the difference
be viewed as a return to his skill as an investmentmanager and, therefore, really be viewed
as a return to labour? (This question has significant policy resonance: in the US, private
equity managers have attempted to receive capital gains treatment for their income,
which inmost cases is simply a return to their labour.More generally, when we tax capital
income preferentially, there are efforts to convert wage income into capital income.)29,30
There is a still further reason for imposing taxes on capital, at rates equal to or
greater than the rates for individuals at comparable income derived from labour.
Ramsey, and most of the subsequent literature, assumed that markets were compet-
itive, that the economy was well-described by a neoclassical model. But today, it is
increasingly being recognised that much of the income at the top is derived from rents
(monopoly rents, from the ability of corporate CEOs to appropriate for themselves
significant fractions of corporate income, from political connections that allow some to
get overpaid for selling goods and services to government or to underpay for the
acquisition of assets from the government etc.). These rents are capitalised and the
returns are treated as if they were returns to capital. While it may not be possible to
identify precisely what income is ‘rent’, the taxation of the capital income of high-
income individuals at high rates may actually discourage such rent-seeking activity and
increase both equality and economic efficiency.31
28 Stiglitz (1985, 1998) emphasises, however, that what matters (in the simple models explored in that
paper) is how the tax on interest income affects the self-selection constraint. In an overlapping generations
model, government may use either social security or debt policy to control capital accumulation. The paper
also explores the case where the government can only affect savings through tax policy, in which case the
direct effects described above become relevant.
29 There are several other arguments for the imposition of taxes (or subsidies) on capital income and/or
bequests. Piketty and Saez (2012) discuss several papers focusing on the effect on capital constraints or on the
risk individuals might face in the labour market. With dynastic utility functions, bequests smooth
consumption across generations, and thus increase average expected utility. If this were the only effect,
depending on the welfare criterion hypothesised, it might even be desirable to subsidise bequests. For a
general survey of inheritance taxation from an optimal tax perspective, see Cremer and Pestieau (2006).
After all, bequests generate utility not only to the giver but also to the receiver. Moreover, one of the reasons
for bequests in a dynastic model is to share one’s good fortune with future generations. Restricting
intergenerational consumption smoothing through bequest taxation thus results in less sharing, i.e. more
volatility in consumption (Stiglitz, 1976; Bevan and Stiglitz, 1979; Farhi and Werning, 2010).
30 Still another reason for imposing capital taxation arises when the social rate of time preference is less
than private individual’s, which can easily arise in overlapping generation models. See De Bonis and Spataro
(2005). This distinction has played an important role in the theory of discounting for social cost–benefit
analysis. See, e.g. Stiglitz (1982b).
31 For a general theoretical discussion of these points, see Stiglitz (2012). For empirical evidence in
support, see Piketty et al. (2011) and Piketty (2014).
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10. Ramsey Taxation and Pigouvian Corrective Taxation
Ramsey essentially assumed a well-functioning market economy.32 The only distortions
in his model were the tax distortions upon which he focused. His mentor, A. C. Pigou,
had highlighted the role of corrective taxation – using taxes to equal private and social
costs, e.g. in the case of environmental externalities.33
Dasgupta and Stiglitz’s (1971) analysis provided a hint of what optimal taxation
might look like in the presence of other distortions. They showed that in their model,
optimal taxes required an equi-proportionate reduction in consumption from what it
would be if consumers were charged the (appropriately calculated) shadow prices.
Sandmo (1975) extended the analysis of Ramsey and the subsequent optimal tax
literature including that of DS to include externalities, deriving Ramsey-like formulae
which explicitly pay attention to the effects of corrective taxation on revenues derived
from other taxes and to the distributional impact of taxation and of the externalities
themselves (which may affect those at different levels of income differently). Sandmo
(1976) showed, analogous to the results of DS, that if there are restrictions on the set of
taxes that can be imposed, it will in general be desirable to impose taxes or subsidies on
related goods, which discourage the consumption of the externality-generating
commodity.
Cremer et al. (1998) then extended Sandmo’s work to include the further insights
that the later literature had provided, i.e. the dependence of optimal structure on the
set of feasible taxes. They showed, for instance, that optimal taxation entails a general
income tax combined with standard Pigouvian taxes under the Atkinson–Stiglitz
assumptions of separability.34
Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) obtained formulae describing optimal taxes in the special
case of distortions arising from moral hazard.35 Insurance induces individuals to
undertake too little effort at accident avoidance (increasing, as a result, the probability
of the insured against event). They establish the (not surprising) result that taxes and
subsidies should be used to discourage, for instance, smoking and drinking –
consistent with the popular ‘sin taxes’, but without the moral overtones. But for our
purposes, perhaps the most interesting insight arises in the context of what they call
the three-level agency problem: governments attempt to affect both the behaviour of
consumers directly and of insurance companies; and insurance companies attempt to
affect the behaviour of those they insure. As they observe (p. 9):
the determinants of optimal taxes in the three-tier problem are ‘an order more
complicated’ than in the two-tier problem, for example depending on the rate
of change of elasticities in addition to elasticities.
32 Though in one of the examples he uses to illustrate the generality of his model, he does discuss the
need to impose motor taxes to ‘offset’ damage to roads, and that his taxes should be viewed as added on to
these corrective taxes.
33 This Section focuses on the use of taxes to correct negative externalities. But subsidies can similarly be
used to correct positive externalities, such as those associated with innovation. Recently, Stiglitz (2014) had
derived Ramsey-like formulae for such corrective taxation.
34 That is, if individuals of different types have the same marginal rates of substitution at any given
consumption bundle.
35 Many other special cases have also been examined. For instance, Mayeres and Proost (1997) analyse
optimal taxation with congestion type externalities.
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There has been considerable controversy over whether and how various results in
optimal tax theory apply in the presence of externalities and other market failures. DS
had earlier shown that in the presence of market distortions, the standard results in
optimal tax theory should be viewed as describing deviations between consumer prices
and shadow producer prices. Kaplow (2012) has similarly demonstrated analogous
results in the presence of an income tax. One can think of designing the tax system as a
two stage process–first imposing corrective taxes, to make producer prices aligned with
shadow prices, and then going from these prices to consumer prices in the usual way.
This means that with separability between leisure and consumption goods (including
pollution), and an optimal income tax, no further commodity taxes should be imposed
in the second stage; and if there are commodity taxes, there is always a distributional
neutral reform of the income tax system that is Pareto improving. As before, it might
be desirable to impose additional taxes (beyond the Pigouvian levels) on a pollution
generating activity in the absence of separability or with preference heterogeneity.36
11. Ramsey Taxation and Developing Countries
Our discussion so far has suggested that Ramsey’s results have limited direct
applicability to the design of commodity tax structures (or to whether it is desirable
to tax interest income) in advanced countries, simply because in almost all there are
(or could and should be) progressive income taxes. But such taxes play a far less
important role in most developing countries and it is in this context that they may be
most relevant.
A careful application of Ramsey’s analysis to these countries requires, however, a
careful analysis of:
(i) the constraints on taxation;
(ii) the elasticities of demand and supply; and
(iii) the structure of the economy.
As we have repeatedly noted, Ramsey’s original analysis included a discussion of the
design of taxation, given that certain taxes were fixed (and more relevant for our
purposes, certain sectors/commodities were not taxed at all, i.e. face a fixed tax rate of
zero). In developing countries, output and consumption in the rural sector typically
cannot be taxed and often the only taxes that can be imposed are those on imports.
Taxing imports, though, leads to a production distortion. Partly on the basis of these
36 In particular Stiglitz (2013) constructs a model without separability showing that so long as the wage
elasticity is positive and the revenues of the incremental pollution tax are used to reduce the income tax,
there is a ‘double dividend’ from taxing pollution at the margin. (Nordhaus, 1993 has similarly argued that
the revenue benefits of a carbon tax lead to a higher optimal level of the carbon tax). As we noted earlier,
in the general case, the imposition of any tax has to be sensitive to the impact of the tax on other sources
of revenue and about the distributional consequences of the tax and the uses to which any revenue raised
is put. What it neat about Kaplow’s formulation focusing on distributional neutral changes is that he
addresses these issues head on. It appears that those, like Parry (1994) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1996),
who argue that optimal carbon tax rates are ‘far below the marginal environmental damages–and may even
be negative’ (p. 994) have imposed particular restrictions on how the proceeds are distributed (that they
assert are plausible but that may be less convincing to others) and have typically not noted how sensitive
results are to specifications, for instance, concerning separability of utility functions and homogeneity of
preferences.
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production distortions, international agencies, like the IMF, have inveighed against
them and trade agreements have forced many countries to reduce import tariffs. But
once we recognise that production (consumption) in the rural sector cannot be taxed,
the DS analysis suggests that nonetheless imports should be taxed, and Emran and
Stiglitz (2005) show that to be the case.37
Small open developing countries, in assessing the elasticity of supply, have to be
particularly sensitive to movements of factors into and out of the country. A major
factor inhibiting the taxation of capital – or the imposition of progressive taxation
more generally – is that such taxes may reduce the supply of capital or of skilled
labour.38
Finally, we observe (as we have already noted) that Ramsey assumed a well-
functioning competitive economy, where the only distortions arose from taxation. In
all countries – and especially in developing countries – there are a multitude of other
distortions. Efficiency wages in the urban sector may give rise to unemployment. In
such a case, tax policy has to take into account both the limitations on the ability to tax
the rural sector and the effect of any taxation on induced unemployment.39
12. Concluding Comments
Ramsey’s paper can be viewed as the seminal paper in what has become an immense
literature on optimal taxation.40 He focused narrowly on the question of how to
minimise the deadweight losses associated with commodity taxation. His contributions –
both methodological and in terms of insights into the design of tax structure – have
been lasting.41
The subsequent literature took many turns and twists. The original suggestion, that
inelastically demanded commodities like bread should face a high tax rate, was
regressive enough; but Ramsey-like arguments were then used against any taxation of
the income from capital, or even bequests. But even as those arguments were being
formulated, deeper analyses suggested just the contrary – goods demanded by the poor
37 This result has given rise to some controversy over the conditions under which a VAT can suffice. See,
Keen (2008) and Boadway and Sato (2009). A key issue not addressed adequately in the literature so far is the
implication of alternative tax structures for risk bearing, e.g. input taxes can increase the risk burden borne
by farmers.
38 Similar results are relevant when applying optimal tax theory to a local government within a nation,
within which factors of production move freely. This severely limits the ability to impose redistributive taxes at
the local level (Stiglitz, 1977, 1983a, b). This analysis has an obvious and immediate application to attempts to
impose redistributive taxes within the EU.
39 See, for instance, Sah and Stiglitz (1992) and Stiglitz (2010).
40 There are many other directions in which Ramsey’s work has had great influence. Ramsey focused on a
government needing to raise a fixed amount of revenue. The amount of revenue to be raised depends on the
desirable level of public goods, itself a result of balancing out the marginal benefit of public goods and the
marginal costs of raising the revenue – which in turn depends on the design of the tax structure. Much of the
literature already referred to address these issues. In the absence of perfect redistributive taxation, the level
and form of public expenditure needs to be sensitive to distributional consequences (Stiglitz, 1998). This is a
sub-theme within the huge literature in cost–benefit analysis.
41 We have not been able to address many of the interesting and difficult questions that have been
addressed in the huge literature that has grown out of Ramsey’s work. For instance, natural formulations of
optimal tax problems give rise to non-convexities, which in turn imply that optimal taxes should be random.
See, e.g. Stiglitz (1983b), Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) and Brito et al. (1995). Nor we have considered the costs
of administering the tax system and compliance (Slemrod, 1990).
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should be taxed at lower rates, and interest income should be taxed. Though the path-
breaking work of DM showed that Ramsey’s results could be generalised in some
important ways, other work showed that the domain of applicability of Ramsey’s
original insights may be more limited: changes in assumptions about the set of feasible
taxes (not allowing certain taxes, or allowing a progressive income tax or non-linear
commodity taxes) and, in particular, about the taxation of pure rents, incorporating
more explicitly distributional considerations, and/or recognising the important ways
in which our economy differs from the competitive model underlying Ramsey’s analysis
all change the optimal structure of commodity taxation in important ways.
Ramsey ended his 1927 essay by modestly observing that ‘the more complicated
results’ he had obtained might ‘well be valid under still wider conditions. But these are,
in the general case, too complicated to be worth setting down in the absence of
practical data to compare with them’ (p. 60). We have noted that indeed many of the
more complicated results described here require estimates of parameters about which
there is little information. In the end, perhaps the most important contribution of the
line of work growing out of Ramsey’s seminal paper is to reinforce our basic intuitions
about what kinds of tax structures make sense, remembering that if it were not for our
concern about distribution – if we cared only about minimising the deadweight loss of
our tax system- we would have imposed lump sum taxes: tax structures that make use of
observable information, that these extensions of Ramsey’s analyses support had we had
the information that we would have liked to have had, taking note of the distortionary
consequences of imposing taxes on these ‘observable but alterable’ variables. That is,
to put it roughly: progressive income taxes, complemented by indirect taxation,
bequest taxes and capital taxes that enhance the progressivity that can be achieved by
the tax system while limiting the level of distortion (dead weight loss.)
Columbia University
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TILE problem I propose to tackle is this: a given revenue 
is to be raised by proportionate taxes on some or all uses of income, 
the taxes on different uses being possibly at different rates; how 
should these rates be adjusted in order that the decrement of 
utility may be a minimum? I propose to neglect altogether 
questions of distribution and considerations arising from the 
differences in the marginal utility of money to different people; 
and I shall deal only with a purely competitive system with no 
foreign trade. Further I shall suppose that, in Professor Pigou's 
terminology, private and social net products are always equal 
or have been made so by State interference not included in the 
taxation we are considering. I thus exclude the case discussed 
in Marshall's Principles in which a bounty on increasing-return 
commodities is advisable. Nevertheless we shall find that the 
obvious solution that there should be no differentiation is entirely 
erroneous. 
The effect of taxation is to transfer income in the first place 
from individuals to the State and then, in part, back again to 
rentiers and pensioners. These transfers will slightly alter the 
demand schedules in a way depending on the incidence of the 
taxes and the manner of their expenditure. I neglect these 
alterations; 1 and I also suppose that " a given revenue " means 
a given money revenue, " money " being so adjusted that its 
marginal utility is constant. 
This problem was suggested to me by Professor Pigou, to 
whom I am also indebted for help and encouragement in its 
solution. 
In the first part I deal with the perfectly general utility 
function and establish a result which is valid for a sufficiently 
small revenue, and takes a peculiarly simple form if we can 
treat the revenue as an infinitesimal. I prove, in fact, that 
in raising an infinitesimal revenue by proportionate taxes on 
given commodities the taxes should be such as to diminish in 
the same proportion the production of each commodity taxed. 
In the second part I assume that the utility function is 
quadratic, which means roughly that the supply and demand 
1 The outline of a more general treatment is given in the Appendix. 
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curves are straight lines, but does not exclude the most general 
possibilities of joint supply and joint demand. With this assump- 
tion we can show that the rule given above for an infinitesimal 
revenue is valid for any revenue which can be raised at all. 
In the third part I give certain important special cases of 
these general theorems; and in part four indicate certain practical 
applications. 
PART I 
(1) I suppose there to be altogether n commodities on which 
incomes are spent and denote the quantities of them which are 
produced in a unit of time by xl, x2 . . . Xn. Some of these 
commodities may be identical, save for the place or manner of 
their production or consumption; e.g., we can regard sugar 
used in tea as a different commoodity from sugar used in coffee, 
and corn grown in Norfolk as different from that grown in Suffolk. 
In order to avoid double reckoning we suppose that these com- 
modities are all either consumed or saved; e.g., we include 
household coal, but not industrial coal except in so far as an 
increase in the stock of industrial coal is a form of saving, so that 
this rate of increase can form one of our quantities x. The 
quantities x1, x2 . . . can be measured in any convenient different 
units. 
(2) We denote by u = F(x1 . . . xn) the net utility of pro- 
ducing and consuming (or saving) these quantities of commodities. 
This is usually regarded as the difference of two functions, one of 
which represents the utility of consuming, the other the disutility 
of producing. But so to regard it is to make an unnecessary 
assumption of independence between consumption and pro- 
duction; to assume, for instance, that the utility of a hot bath is 
the same whether one does or does not work in a coal mine. 
This assumption we do not require to make. 
(3) If there is no taxation stable equilibrium will occur for 
values, of the x's which make u a maximum. Let us call these 
values Y.,, . . Y. or collectively the point P. Then at P 
we have 
=Z0 rz=1,. ..n. dau = 72 
EEU _ 82dx,bdx. is a negative definite form. S e axe are 
Su-ppose now taxes are levied on the clifferent commodities 
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at the rates A1, A2 . . . An per unit in money whose marginal 
utility is unity. Then the new equilibrium is determined by 
azr 
At r 1,..n ....(1 
In virtue of these equations we can regard the A's as functions 
of the x's, which vanish at P, and satisfy identically 
aAr _ aAS a2u (2) 
ax, - = axrx I* 
Also the revenue R LArXr. 
We shall always suppose R to be positive, but there is no 
a priori reason why some of the A's should not be negative; they 
will then, of course, represent bounties. 
(4) Our first problem is this: given R, how should the A's 
be chosen in order that the values of the x's given by equations (1) 
shall make u a maximum. 
I.e., u is to be a maximum subject to ZArX*r = (where Ar is a) 
We must have 
O = du = ArdXr for any values of dxr 
subject to 
O dR EArdXr + ?x5, ax dxr 
r a VXr 
and so we have 
A1 - A2 n (3) 
Exi 
aA 
ss ZX$ ?-S A 




(5) These equations determine values of the x's which are 
critical for u, and it remains to discuss the possibility of a plurality 
of solutions and to determine conditions under which they give 
a true maximum. We shall show that if 1 is small enough 
they will have a unique solution x1, x2 . . . Xn, which tends to 
X1, X2 . . . Y. as B + 0, and that this solution will make u a true 
maximum. 
1 E.g., if U = Ul - u2 (consumers' utility - producers' disutility) 
aX = 8u, _ uz = demand price of rth commodity - supply price = tax. 
No. 145.-VOL. XXXVII. E 
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For, since d2u = LaAr dx,dx8 is negative definite at P, 
a(Xj) X2 . An) is positive at, and therefore near, P. Hence a(X1, X2 . . Xn) 
we can express the x's as functions of the A's. The equations (3) 
then become 
Ar RBr(Aj . . . An) r= 1, 2, . . . n. 
For the denominator EE aas , is a negative definlite form with 
d2u and so cannot vanish near P (and therefore also 6 > 0). The 
Jacobian of these last equations with regard to the A's will tend 
to 1 as R tends to 0, and they will therefore have a unique solution 
A1, . . . An which tends to 0, 0 . . 0 as B tends to 0. Hence 
the equations (3) have a unique solution tending to P as R - 0. 
We have now to consider the conditions for a maximum 
which are obtained most simply by Lagrange's multipliers. 
If we consider u + KR 
au a]? 
we should have a + 
or 1 + K K 0 if 6 has the meaning it has in equations (3). 
or K 10 




0 - d2R 
(calculated as if the variables x were independent 1), and in a 
sufficiently small neighbourhood of P we shall have H < any 
assigned positive constant and so d2u ? 1 d2R negative 
definite with d2u. This establishes the desired result.2 
(6) Suppose now R and the A's can be regarded as infini- 
tesimals; then putting 
Ar eg ( Ar dx2 
equations (3) give us'. using (2), 
1 See, e.g., de la VallWe Poussin, Cours d'Analyse, 4th ed., t. 1, p. 149. 
2 Clearly also we shall get a maximum at any point for which d2R is negative 
and 0 < 1; i.e., if d2R is everywhere negative (3) will give a maximumn for all values 
of 0 up to 0 = 1, which gives a maximum of R. This covers the case treated in 
Part 1I and so also any case approximating to that. 
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Z 4dx. R 
and their solution is evidently given by 
dxl dx2 dxo 0<0 (4) 
x1 X2 
i.e., the production of each commodity should be diminished in 
the same proportion. 
(7) It is interesting to extend these results to the case of a 
given revenue to be raised by taxing certain commodities only. 
If the utility were the sum of two functions, one of the taxed and 
the other of the untaxed commodities, it is obvious that our 
conclusions would be the same as before. But in the general 
case the question is by no means so simple. 
Let us denote the quantities of the commodities to be taxeed 
by xl . . . xn, and those not to be taxed by Yi . . . Yn. 
If At a- then A, is the tax per unit on x, 
aur 
and if r = -u, , = 0 (A's and u's functions of x's and y's), 
also as before 
-A7 - _ --, andA - L* (5) 
ax, aXr' aY, ayr y. a-x 
and we have to maximise u subject to 
B)rz ju,(t - O, t -- 1, . . . m. 
r-1 
We have 
O = du Adx, 
7 
O dR= dB A xr + ZL'x4aztdxr + EEx ay*dyt 
0 = d=t -Lt dXr + E)dYud t=l, . .. m. 
Solving these last equations (d=t 0) for the dy's we obtain 
dyt ExtrdXr .(6) 
where / a?t?ut =0 {r n (7) 
(The possibility of solution is guaranteed by the discriminants of 
d2u not vanishing.) 
Whence 0=dR =ZdxT(Ar + ZX4 LA + ZZXS Xtr) 
E 2 
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instead of equations (3) we have 
2m =~~~~~~~ (3') Enx + 
__ Xtr) 8=1 (+r+t=l at 
It can be shown that these give a maximum of u with the 
same sort of limitations as equations (3) do. 
(8) And if the A's are infinitesimal 
Ar E - dx8 + E LAr dyt 
8 ax, t ayt 
= 8dx + 2mxts T-) by (5), (6). 
But tx 'ts x, - EE 'LuXtXXur by (7) 
t x t u y 
X-Xtr 
K: 
(by symmetry since VY= yt). 
SO Ar,= 2dxs(2 + Lxtr aAs) since E aaye 
8a Xr t vYtyt,since 





i.e., as before the taxes should be such as to reduce in the same 
proportion the production of each taxed commodity. 
(9) Further than this it is difficult to go without making some 
new assumption. The assumption I propose is perhaps un- 
necessarily restrictive, but it still allows scope for all possible 
first-order relations between commodities in respect of joint 
supply or joint demand, and it has the great merit of rendering 
the problem completely soluble. 
I shall assume that the utility is a non-homogeneous quadratic 
function of the x's, or that the A's are linear. This assumption 
simplifies the problem in precisely the same way as we have 
previously simplified it by supposing the taxes to be infinitesimal. 
We shall, however, make this new assumption the occasion for 
exhibiting a method of interpreting our formulae geometrically 
in a manner which makes their meaning and mutual relations 
considerably clearer. 
It is not, of course, necessary, nor would it be sensible to 
suppose the utility function quadratic for all values of the 
variables; we need only suppose it so for a certain range of 
values round the point P, such that there is no question of imposing 
taxes large enough to move the production point (values of the 
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x's) outside this range. If we were concerned with independent 
commodities, this assumption would mean that the taxes were 
small enough for us to treat the supply and demand curves as 
straight lines. 
PART II 
(10) Let u = constant + Zarxr + EZZr87xas, (irs = fl,r), and 
let us regard the x's as rectangular Cartesian co-ordinates of 
points in n-dimensional space. 
The point P(Y1, . . . Xn) is given by -a-- = 0, 
and at that point 
d2u 2EZX/38rdx7dX8 is a negative definite form. 
.ZZ,BxrxS is a negative definite form, 
and the loci u = constant are hyper-ellipsoids with the point 
P for centre. 
Since Ar = ar + 2L?fras .(8) 
axr a 
R = 2Arxr = 2arxr + 2Z'flrsxrxs . . . (9) 
and the loci B = constant are hyper-ellipsoids with the point 
Q, whose co-ordinates are 2X1, 22 . for centre. 
(The equations for Q are those for P with their first degree 
terms doubled and their constant terms unaltered.) 
Moreover, the hyper-ellipsoids u = constant, R = constan-t 
are all similar and similarly situated. The figure shows these 





(11) If we are to raise a revenue p we must depress production 
to some point on the hyper-ellipsoid 1 = p.1 
1 We can depress production to any point we please because the connection 
between the x's and A's is one-one. 
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To do this so as to make u a maximum we must choose a 
point on this hyper-ellipsoid at which it touches an ellipsoid of 
the family u = constant. There will be two such points which 
will lie on the line PQ: one between Q and P making u a 
maximum, the other between 0 and Q making u a minimum. 
For the point of contact of two similar and similarly situated 
hyper-ellipsoids must lie on the line joining their centres. Since 
the maximum of u is given by a point on OP we have as before 
that 
The taxes should be such as to diminish the production of all 
commodities in the same proportion. 
And this result is now valid not merely for an infinitesimal 
revenue but for any revenue which it is possible to raise at all. 
The maximum revenue will be obtained by diminishing the 
production of each commodity to one-half of its previous amount, 
i.e., to the point Q. 
(12) If in accordance with this rule we impose taxes reducing 
production from x, x2 . . . Zn to (1 - k).T, (1 - k)T2 
(1 - k)Xn. 
We get from (8) Ar ar + 2(1 - k)ZfirsYr, 
8 
but at P Ar 0, so that 0 ar + 2ZPra-r; 
r 
therefore Ar kar .(10) 
i.e., the taxes should be in the fixed proportions A :A2: 
:An:: a,: a2 : an independent of the revenue to be raised. 
Also B = R Arxr k(l - k)Zarwr, 
= 4k(1 k) X the maximum revenue (got by putting 
k =). 
(13) Since k is positive it follows from (10) that the sign of 
A, is the same as that of ar, and unless the ar are all positive some 
of the Ar will be negative, and the most expedient way of raising a 
revenue will be by placing bounties on some commodities and 
taxes on others. 
The sort of case in which this might occur is that of sugar 
and particularly sour fruits, e.g. damsons. A tax on sugar 
might reduce the consumption of damsons more than in pro- 
portion to the reduction in the total consumption of sugar and so 
require to be offset by a bounty on damsons. 
(14) We can now consider the more general problem: a given 
revenue is to be raised by means of fixed taxes ul . . . t.m on 
m commodities and by taxes to be chosen at discretion on the 
remainder. How should they be chosen in order that utility 
may be a maximum? 
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We have A1 =,ul, . . . An = -m, m hyperplanes (n - 1 
folds) whose intersection is a plane n - n fold which we will 
call S. S will cut the hyper-ellipsoids u = constant, R = con- 
stant in hyper-ellipsoids which are similar and similarly situated 
and whose centres are the points P', and Q' in which S is met by 
the rn-folds through P and Q conjugate to S in u = c or B = c. 
As before the required maximum is given by the point of contact 
of two of these hyper-ellipsoids in S, which must lie upon the 
line P'Q. 
Now the hyperplane A1 = p, or aX = l is conjugate in 
u = c to the diameter 
X2 2X3 X's . . . Xn = Xn. 
Hence S is conjugate to the rn-fold 
Xm+1 = XM+, . . ., Xn = Xn, 
and the co-ordinates of P' satisfy these equations, since they lie 
on this rn-fold. 
Similarly the co-ordinates of Q' satisfy 
XM+1 - lXm+,l . . . Xn = jXn. 
And so the desired production point lying on the line P'Q' satisfies 
Xin+1 Xm+2 Xn 
Xin+1 Xm+2 Xn 
i.e., the whole system of taxes must be such as to reduce in the 
same proportion the productilon of the commodities taxed at 
discretion. 
PART III 
(1 5) I propose now to explain what our results reduce to in 
certain special cases. First suppose that all the commodities 
are independent and have their own supply and demand equations, 
i.e., we have for the rth commodity the demand price 
pi r(xr) 
and the supply price qr fr(xr). 
Alr pr - qr =#r(Xr) fr(xr), 
a,nd equations (3) become, since A- 0, rts, 
A1 
~~~~~A2 
1{l'(Xl) - f1'(x1)} X2{02'(X2) - f2'(x2)} = * - 0 
These equations we can express in terms of elasticities in the 
following way. 
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Suppose the tax ad valorem (reckoned on the price got by the 
producer) on the rth commodity is p.T, then 
Ar = /Lrqr = jtrfr(Xr)) 
and #r(xr) fr(xr) + Ar (1 + pr)fr(xr). 
Xrt{r'(Xr) fr (xr) - (1 + ttr)Xr? 
fr'(~~~~~~~~r(r +/r)x o(r 
now xrf (*) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of supply of the 
fr(xr) 
commodity reckoned positive for diminishing returns, and 
- *r0*(xr) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand, reckoned 
#r.(Xr) 
positive in the normal case. 
Hence if we denote by pr and Er the elasticities of demand and 
supply, 
= 0(! + 1 ? Ir) 
or (11) 
Pr 
(valid provided the revenue is small enough, see ? 5). 
For infinitesimal taxes 0 is infinitesimal and 
1 1 1 1 P l . * (12) 
E1 Pi en p?l 
i.e., the tax ad valorem on each commodity should be proportional 
to the sum of the reciprocals of its supply and demand 
elasticities. 
(16) It is easy to see 
(1) that the same rule (12) applies if the revenue is to be 
collected off certain commodities only, which have supply 
and demand schedules independent of each other and all 
other commodities, even when the other commodities are 
not independent of one another. 
(2) The rule does not justify any bounties; for in stable 
equilibrium, although - may be negative, - + - must be 
Er P~~r Er 
positive. 
(3) If any one commodity is absolutely inelastic, either 
for supply or for demand, the whole of the revenue should be 
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collected off it. This is independently obvious, for taxing 
such a commodity does not diminish utility at all. If there 
are several such commodities the whole revenue should be 
collected off them, it does not matter in what proportions. 
(17) Let us next take the case in which all the commodities 
have independent demand schedules but are complete substitutes 
for supply; i.e., with appropriate units the demand price 
Pr = cr(Xr)) 
the supply price qr = f(x1 + + xn). 
Let us put z-Xi + + xn. 
We can imagine this case as that of a country in which 
all commodities are produced at constant returns by the applica- 
tion of one kind of labour only, the increase in the supply price 
arising solely from the increasing marginal disutility of labour, 
and the commodities satisfying independent needs. Then z 
will represent the amount of labour. 
Equations (3) give us 
-0= Ar 
Wq'(Xr) - zf (z) 
Or if ur represents the tax ad valorem and pr the elasticity of 
demand for the rth commodity and e the elasticity of supply of 
things in general, we get, by a similar process to that of ? 15, 
(1 +1)0 pr 
1--~~~~~~(3 
Pr 
If the taxes are infinitesimal we have 
= 
_0. - . . (14) 
pr 
In this case we see that if the supply of labour is fixed (abso- 
lutely inelastic, e -*0) the taxes should be at the same ad valorem 
rate on all commodities. 
(19) If some commodities only are to be taxed it is easier to 
work from the result proved in ? 8 for an infinitesimal revenue, 
that the production of the commodities taxed should be diminished 
in the same ratio. 
Suppose, then, x1 .  . xm are to be taxed, x+1 . . . 
untaxed. 
Let dx1, = kxl, . . x, d =-Ikxm. 
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Let z' X1 +X2+. .+Xm 
Z 
' - Xm+1 + ?. . + Xn. 
A1 =#(x + dx1) - zf(z + dz) 
=011(x1)dx1- f'(z)dz. 
k dz k dz 
.z. 1 
~~~Pi ZIE PM H m EZ 
now dz 
= 
dz' + dz'=' kz' + dz'", 
also o dxm+j _ dz 
Pm+lXm+1 EZ 
dxm+l dxm+2 dxn dz dz" kz' 
Pm+lXm+1 Pm+2Xm+2 pnXn CZ = CZ + ?nprXr 
mE+1 m+1 
k + a etc. 
1 m+1 
As before we see that of two commodities that should be 
taxed most which has the least elasticity of demand, but that if 
the supply of labour is absolutely inelastic all the commodities 
should be taxed equally. 
PART IV 
(20) We come now to applications of our theory; these cannot 
be made at all exactly without data which I, at any rate, do not 
possess. The simplest result is the one which we have proved 
in the general case for an infinitesimal revenue (? 8); this means 
that it is approximately true for small revenues, and that the 
approximation approaches perfection as the revenue approaches 
zero. It is thus logically similar to the theorem that the period 
of oscillation of a pendulum is independent of the amplitude. 
We have also extended the result to any revenue which does not 
take the production point outside a region in which the utility 
may be taken to be quadratic, i.e., the supply and demand 
schedules linear. 
The sort of cases in which our theory may be useful are the 
following: 
(21) (a) If a commodity is produced by several different 
methods or in several different places between which there is no 
mobility of resources,) it is shown that it will be advantageous to 
discriminate between them and tax most the source of supply 
which is least elastic. For this will be necessary if we are to 
maintain unchanged the proportion of production between the 
two sources (result analogous to ? 19 with supply a.nd demand 
interchanged). 
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(b) If several commodities which are independent for demand 
require precisely the same resources for their production, that 
should be taxed most for which the elasticity of demand is least 
(? 19). 
(c) In taxing commodities which are rivals for demand, like 
wine, beer and spirits, or complementary like tea and sugar, 
the rule to be observed is that the taxes should be such as to 
leave unaltered the proportions in which they are consumed 
(? 14). Whether the present taxes satisfy this criterion I do not 
know. 
(d) In the case of the motor taxes we must separate off so 
much of the taxation as is offset by damage to the roads. This 
part should be so far as possible equal to the damage done. 
The remainder is a genuine tax and should be distributed 
according to our theory; that is to say, it should be placed 
partly on petrol and partly on motor-cars, so as to preserve 
unchanged the proportion between their consumption, and should 
be distributed between Fords' and Morrises, so as to reduce their 
output in the same ratio. The present system fails in both these 
respects. 
(22) (e) Another possible application of our theory is to the 
question of exempting savings from income-tax.' We may con- 
sider two uses of income only, saving and spending, and sup- 
posing them independent we may use the result (13) in ? 17. 
We must suppose the taxes imposed only for a very short time 2 
and that they raise no expectation of similar taxation in the 
future; since otherwise we require a mathematical theory con- 
siderably more difficult than anything in this paper. 
On these assumptions, since the amount of saving in the very 
short time cannot be sufficient to alter appreciably the marginal 
utility of capital, the elasticity of demand for saving will be 
infinite, and we have 
p, (tax on spending) 
Pi 
/x2 (tax /on saving) =-6, 
and we see that income-tax should be partially but not wholly 
remitted on savings. The case for remission would, however, 
I No account is taken of graduation in this. 
2 Strictly, we consider the limit as this time tends to zerQ, 
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be strengthened enormously by taking into account the expecta- 
tion of taxation in the future. 
(23) It should be emphasized in conclusion that the results 
about " infinitesimal " taxes can only claim to be approximately 
true for small taxes, how small depending on data which are not 
obtainable. It is perfectly possible that a tax of 500% on whisky 
could for the present purpose be regarded as small. The unknown 
factors are the curvatures of the supply and demand curves; if 
these are zero our results will be true for any revenue whatever, 
but the greater the curvatures the narrower the range of " small" 
taxes. 
On the other hand, the more complicated results contained 
in equations (3), (3'), (11), (13) may well be valid under still 
wider conditions. But these are, in the general case, too com- 
plicated to be worth setting down in the absence of practical 
data to compare with them. 
APPENDIX 
We can also say something about the more general problem 
in which the State wishes to raise a revenue for two purposes; 
first, as before, a fixed money revenue, R1, which is transferred 
to rentiers or otherwise without effect on the demand schedules; 
and secondly, an additional revenue, R2, sufficient to purchase 
fixed quantities, a,, a2,. . . an of each commodity. 
Let us denote by pr, qr, as before, the demand and supply 
prices of the rth commodity, and the tax on it by Ar. Then if 
xr is the amount of the rth commodity consumed by the public 
(or by the State out of Rl), xi + a, is the amount produced, and 
we have 
au 
=r = lPr(XV, x2,. . ) xn)-qr(x+l + a,, x+t2 . .a, Xn + an), 
Ri + R2 L Arxr, R2 2Zar7q; 
so that u 'is to be a maximum subject to 
LArxr - Za=, R = constant, 
whence 
or = 0, which replace equations (3). 
E a,+ xs)-aq -,E p 
a9 aX. Is TJx, 
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Although these equations do not give such simple results as 
we previously obtained for an infinitesimal revenue or a quadratic 
utility function, in the cases considered in ? 15 and ? 17 they lead 
us again to the equations (11) and (13). 
For, taking the case of ? 15, in which the commodities are 
independent both for demand and supply, and, as before, denoting 
by i, the rate of tax ad valorem on the rth commodity and by 
pr, Er its elasticities of demand and supply for the amounts xr, 
xr + ar respectively consumed and produced by the public, we 
have 
xr + ar dqr xr dppr 
q,. d(xr +r) q,. dXr 
or P r 0 
s+ ur 
Er Pr 
whence1 ( ! which is equation (11) again. And we 
1--- 
Pr 
can similarly derive equation (13) from the assumption of inde- 
pendence for demand and equivalence for supply. 
F. P. RAMSEY 
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